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ABSTRACT 
A hydrologic model is developed to compute the reservoir outflow hydrograph resulting from a hypothetical 
failure of Haditha dam located across the Euphrates river in Iraq due to enemy attack. In this program, the 
reservoir routing is analyzed by the level pool method in which storage is a nonlinear function of discharge. 
The results indicate that the maximum reservoir outflow is (202547 m3/s) which occurred about three and 
half hours after dam failure, and the reservoir will be depleted after about 65 hours. The results of the 
hydrologic model are compared with available results reported by Macdonald and Monopolis (1984), and it is 
found that the hydrologic results situate within the limits of their study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Dams provide society with essential benefits such as 
water supply, flood control, recreation, hydropower and 
irrigation. However, catastrophic flooding occurs when 
a dam fails and the impounded water escapes through 
the breach into the downstream valley. Usually, the 
magnitude of the flow greatly exceeds all previous 
floods and the response time available for warning is 
much shorter than for precipitation-runoff floods (Fread, 
1988). 
Case studies show that dam failures may arise due to 
different reasons ranging from seepage, piping (internal 
erosion), overtopping due to insufficient spillway 
capacity and insufficient free board and to settlements 
due to slope slides on the upstream or downstream 
shells and liquefaction due to earthquakes. Regardless 
of the reason, almost all failures begin with a breach 
formation. Basically, breach is defined as the opening 
formed in the dam body that leads the dam to fail, and 
this phenomenon causes the concentrated water behind 
the dam to propagate towards downstream regions.  
Hundreds of dam failures have occurred throughout 
the history. These failures have caused immense 
property and environmental damages and have taken 
thousands of lives. For example, South Fork Dam, also 
known as the Johnstown Dam in Pennsylvania/U.S.A. 
failed in May 1889. The dam was 36 years old when it 
failed. The earthfill dam was (21.9m) high and 
contained about (14. 2 million m3) of water. The dam 
failed as a result of overtopping that occurred during a 
flood caused by a 25-year frequency storm. The failure 
resulted in about 2,209 deaths, the largest loss of lives 
among all U. S. dam failures. Nearly all of the fatalities 
occurred within the first (22.4 km) downstream from the 
dam. The world’s most catastrophic dam failures 
occurred in August 1975 in the Zhumadian Prefecture of 
Henan Province in central China. A typhoon struck, 
causing reservoirs to swell. Banqiao Dam, (118 meters) 
high, and Shimantan Dam collapsed as did dozens of 
smaller dams. Millions of people lost their homes. The 
death toll estimates for these failures varied widely. Accepted for Publication on 15/7/2011. 
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Approximately 26,000 deaths occurred from drowning 
in the immediate aftermath of the dam collapses. There 
were as many as 230,000 deaths if those who died of 
consequent health epidemics and famine are included 
(Graham, 1999). However, in order to be able to assess 
the consequences of dam failure, simulation of the flood 
caused by a dam break is required to determine the 
inundated area, flood depth and travel time of the flood 
waves, so that adequate safety measures can be 
provided. Many studies have tried to model the flood 
wave resulting from dam failure. Flood routing methods 
have been applied to the reservoirs storage and to the 
outflows resulting from the failure. The purpose of this 
study is to develop a hydrologic model for predicting 
the reservoir outflow hydrograph resulting from the 
hypothetical failure of Haditha dam in Iraq. 
 
RESERVOIR OUTFLOW 
 
The two primary tasks in the analysis of a dam break 
are: the prediction of the reservoir outflow hydrograph 
and the routing of that hydrograph through the 
downstream valley. The determination of the reservoir 
outflow hydrograph can be further subdivided into two 
tasks (Wahl, 1988): 
1- Predicting the breach characteristics (e.g., shape, 
depth, width, rate of breach formation). 
2- Routing the reservoir outflow hydrograph through 
the breached and outlet structures. 
 
Breach Formation 
Concerning the breach simulation, it is possible to 
distinguish the following methods (Wurbs, 1987): 
- Instantaneous complete removal of the dam.  
- Instantaneous partial breach of the dam.  
- Breach the growth of which is fixed with time.  
- Breach the growth  of which is predicted using an 
erosion model.  
The first two methods may be appropriate, 
respectively, for concrete arch dams and for concrete 
gravity dams, but they seem to be too conservative and 
unrealistic for earth embankments. The assumption that 
the breach dimensions grow with time usually according 
to a linear law, appears more likely. However, the fourth 
method provides a more realistic representation of the 
erosion process. The assumption of a linear growth of 
width and depth of a gap is adopted in this study. In 
reality, when outflow is small, erosion is less than that 
supposed in the linear assumption. When the 
downstream water level becomes higher than the sill 
elevation submerged flow will occur. High downstream 
water levels reduce flow gradients thus diminishing the 
erosion capacity of the outflowing waters and 
consequently the erosion may be smaller than that 
supposed in the linear assumption .  
 
Routing the Reservoir Outflow 
The outflow hydrograph of the breached dam is 
computed either by level pool reservoir routing or 
dynamic routing with the breached dam outflow as an 
internal boundary condition between the upstream 
reservoir reach and the downstream river reach. Level 
pool routing is used for wide, flat reservoir surfaces 
with gradual changes in water surface elevation, while 
dynamic routing is needed for narrow valleys with 
significant water surface slope in the reservoir (Strum, 
2001). 
In this study, the reservoir routing system is 
analyzed by the level pool method in which storage is a 
nonlinear function of Q. 
 
Level Pool Reservoir Routing 
Usually, unsteady flow routing in reservoirs is 
approximated by a simple level pool routing technique 
based on the principle of mass conservation; i.e., 
 
)t(Q)t(I
t
S −=∂
∂                                        … (1) 
 
in which inflow (I) and outflow (Q) are functions of 
time (t), and storage (S) is a function of the water-
surface elevation (h) which changes with time (t). The 
reservoir is assumed always to have a horizontal water 
surface throughout its length (Fread and Hsu, 1993). 
Level pool routing is a procedure for calculating the 
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outflow hydrograph from a reservoir with a horizontal 
water surface, given its inflow hydrograph and storage – 
outflow hydrograph (Chow et al., 1988). 
The time horizon is broken into intervals of duration 
∆t, indexed by j; that is, t = 0, ∆t, 2∆t, …, j∆t, ( j + 1 ) 
∆t, … and the continuity equation is integrated over 
each time interval. For the j-th time interval: 
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The inflow values at the beginning and at the end of 
the j-th time interval are Ij and Ij+1, respectively, and the 
corresponding values of the outflow are Qj,Qj+1. If the 
variation of inflow and outflow over the interval is 
approximately linear, the change in storage over interval 
Sj,Sj+1 can be found by rewriting equation (2) as: 
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The values of Ij and Ij+1 are known because they are 
prespecified. The values of Qj and Sj are known at the jth 
time interval from calculation during the previous time 
interval. Hence, the equation contains two unknown Qj+1 
and Sj+1, which are isolated by multiplying equation (3) 
through by 2/∆t and rearranging the result to produce: 
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In routing the flow through the time interval j, all the 
terms on the right side of equation (4) are known, and so 
the value of (2Sj+1/∆t + Qj+1) can be computed. 
Reservoir outflow Qj+1 (breach outflow + spillway 
outflow + outlet work outflow) can be computed as a 
function of water surface elevation upstream and 
downstream of the dam using weir and orifice 
equations. When Qj+1 is determined, Sj+1 can be 
obtained. Water surface elevation in the reservoir is 
computed by means of the relationship between storage 
and water surface elevation. 
To set up the data required for the next time interval, 
the value of (2Sj+1 /∆t - Qj+1) is calculated by: 
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THE CASE STUDY (HADITHA DAM) 
 
Haditha dam is a multi-purpose hydro-development 
designed to control the Euphrates river flow in interests 
of irrigation, electric power generation and for partial 
accumulation of extreme Euphrates river inflows into 
Haditha reservoir. Haditha dam was constructed on the 
Euphrates river in the middle west of Iraq 7 km 
upstream from Haditha town. The project generates 
(660 MW) of electrical power aside from performing its 
flood control function. Central and southern parts of 
Iraq get the benefit of irrigation water from its reservoir. 
Haditha dam was conceived in the late 1960s but 
construction did not begin until 1977. The Haditha 
dam's embankment was designed by the Soviet Union's 
Ministry of Energy and its power station was designed 
and constructed by Yugoslavian firms. It was conceived 
as a multi-purpose dam that would generate 
hydroelectric power, regulate the flow of the Euphrates 
and provide water for irrigation. Construction lasted 
between 1977 and 1987 and was a joint undertaking by 
the Soviet Union and Iraq. The dam consists of an 
asphaltic concrete cutoff wall at its core, followed by 
mealy detrital dolomites and a mixture of sand and 
gravel. These materials were chosen because they are 
readily available near the construction site. This core is 
protected by a reinforced concrete slab revetment on the 
upstream side of the dam and a rock-mass revetment on 
the downstream side. Flood control at Haditha dam is 
accomplished with a spillway integrated in the 
powerhouse and equipped with six radial gates of 16m 
width and 13m height each. Sill level of the spillway is 
at an elevation of 134m a. s. 1. and the top elevation of 
the radial gates in closed position is at 147m a. s. l., 
which is the normal height of water level. The storage 
volume of the reservoir at this elevation is 8.2 x 109 m3, 
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whereas at the maximum design reservoir level of 150m 
a. s. l. it is approximately 9.7 x 109 m3 of water to be 
stored in the reservoir (Swiss Consultants, 1985 a).  
Since Haditha city lies between Al-Qaim near the 
west border of Iraq, which is considered an entry point, 
and Baghdad, Haditha became a center for fighting after 
Haditha dam and the surrounding areas were initially 
secured by U. S. troops in April 2003 as part of the 
invasion of Iraq. Also, Haditha dam is considered the 
second-largest hydroelectric contributor to the power 
system in Iraq after the Mosul dam, and therefore an 
attack on the dam would result in severely flooded 
towns along the Euphrates downstream from Haditha, as 
well as eliminating an important source of electricity 
and affecting the functioning of the country's electrical 
grid. Therefore, in this study, the failure of Haditha dam 
by an enemy attack is considered the most probable 
failure.  
 
SELECTED DAM – BREAK ASSUMPTIONS 
 
As explained above, the failure of Haditha dam is 
supposed to be by an enemy attack. In this study, MK 
84 penetration bomb shall be considered. Such a bomb 
could create a crater of a depth of up to 16 m in earth 
dam or rock fill or of up to 4m in solid concrete (Swiss 
Consultants, 1985 a). The spillway and powerhouse 
section forms a part of the dam. The power house block 
is located in the center of the valley. All gates, doors, 
trapdoors, …etc are weak points where attacks could 
occur. Flooding of the power house could cause a lot of 
damage, but the concrete structure would definitely 
resist the erosion forces of water. The side wall on the 
other hand is too solid to be destroyed and initiate an 
erosion of the embankment dam, therefore it is assumed 
that the attack will be on the embankment to the left 
side of the powerhouse. Due to the sandy–silty nature of 
the fill, the erosion will proceed quickly vertically down 
to the valley bottom and sidewards to the powerhouse 
block on one side and on the other side at least to the 
point where the foundation level rises significantly. On 
the left side, the valley bottom is at an elevation of 
100m a. s. l. and on the right side the valley bottom is at 
an elevation of 105m a. s. l. The lateral washout rate for 
channel sides is assumed to be about (2.6m/min), the 
size of the breach is calculated for each time step by 
assuming a linear growth of width and depth from the 
initial values until the final depth within the given 
breach time. This assumption is crude, however, 
although the erosion capability of the outflowing waters 
increases with the size of the breach, the dam volume to 
be eroded increases as well. It is assumed that these 
factors compensate to a linear behavior. In reality, it is 
to be expected that in the very first phase, when the 
outflow is still small, erosion is less than supposed in 
the linear assumption. In the following phase, a rapid 
development of the breach may be expected, while in 
the final phase erosion may be smaller since the high 
downstream water levels reduce flow gradients, thus 
diminishing the erosion capacity of the outflowing 
waters. The assumption of linear growth of width and 
depth of the gap that is adopted in this study is 
considered as an approximation to the real process. 
A possible scenario is given hereafter and breach 
formation is assumed to consist of four phases: 
 
Phase (1) 
The first phase starts at the enemy attack with MK84 
penetration bombs. A channel of trapezoidal cross-
section with (86.5m) top width at the top of the left 
embankment and (22.5m) bottom width is assumed to 
be formed within about 3 minutes. The side slope of the 
breach is assumed 1V: 2H. Typically 0 ≤ H ≤ 2 (Chow 
et al., 1988). 
The final shape of the assumed channel is the same 
as if one assumes that a breach section is formed at the 
top of the embankment with a top width of (2.6m), a 
side slope of 1V:2H and an initial depth of (0.48m). 
Then the channel sides erode at a rate of (2.6m/min) and 
the channel bottom erodes at a rate of (0.48m/min). The 
estimated time required to perform the same channel 
with the aforementioned dimensions is approximately 
33 minutes. 
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Phase (2) 
Once a first breach is opened and a larger quantity of 
water starts to flow out of the reservoir, the enlargement 
of the breach will proceed quickly. During this phase, 
the channel sides erode at a rate of (2.6m/min) and the 
channel bottom erodes at a rate of (0.48m/min). The 
bottom of the breach will be lowered until it reaches the 
valley bottom (an elevation of 100m a.s.l). Further 
down cutting is prevented since the river bed is less 
erodible. This phase is assumed to last 79 minutes. 
 
Phase (3) 
In the third phase, the breach will extend to both 
sides by the flowing water. The breach is enlarged 
laterally at the same rate of (2.6m/min) and side slope of 
1V:2H until the left side of the channel reaches the left 
valley side, and no further lateral growth of the left 
breach side occurs. This phase is assumed to last 90.7 
minutes. 
 
Phase (4) 
During this phase, which lasts about 41.5 minutes, 
the lateral erosion will proceed sidewards to the 
powerhouse block on the right side, as mentioned 
above. The block itself will not fail. At the end of this 
phase, the breach reaches its final shape, which will be 
limited at the bottom by the surrounding valley bottom 
elevation and to the sides by the powerhouse block and 
by the left valley side.  
As a summary, in this scenario, it was assumed that 
almost the complete dam to the left of the power house 
block will erode. The final shape of the breach has a 
bottom width of 420m and a side angle of about 26.50 at 
the left valley side and a vertical delimitation at the 
powerhouse block. It is assumed that the material is 
eroded down to an elevation of 100.00m a.s.l. The 
breach development time is approximately three and 
half hours.  
The sketch of this scenario is presented in Figures 
(1) through (4).  
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE ELEMENT OF THE 
HYDROLOGIC MODEL 
 
A hydrologic model requires the determination of 
the following: 
The Initial Conditions for the Reservoir before the 
Failure 
a- Initial elevation of the reservoir before failure 
(146m). 
b- Initial inflow to the reservoir before failure 
(795m3/s .)  
c- Initial outflow from the reservoir before failure 
(502m3/s). 
 
The Inflow to the Reservoir during the Time of 
Simulation 
It was assumed that the mean daily inflow to the 
Haditha reservoir during the time of simulation is 
(2799m3/s) in May 1988.  
 
The Outlet Works, Spillway and Breach Flow 
Models 
It was assumed that at the onset of failure the 
spillway gates can't be opened because of a 
malfunctioning mechanism, an accident or a repair 
work, and that-simultaneously-no discharge through the 
bottom outlets and turbines will be possible. Therefore, 
all discharge facilities are closed and their flows don’t 
need to be modelled. The breach (weir) is defined by its 
sill elevation and width, both given as functions of time. 
Weir outflow is calculated according to the Jacobi 
formula, where the parameter M is given as input. 
According to the shape of the sill, M varies between 1. 
21 and 1. 62 (Swiss Consultants, 1985c). 
 
B*h*g**Q . 5101 23
2 µ=           … (6) 
 
Where: 
h0 = H0 - Zw 
H0 = Upstream water level 
Zw = Sill elevation 
B = Average width of overfall 
Predicting the Breach…                                         Saleh I. Khassaf, Kareem R. Abeed and Layla A. Mohammed Saleh 
 
- 398 - 
g = Gravity acceleration (9. 81 m/s2) 
Q = Discharge 
µ1 = Discharge coefficient = 1. 0607 * M-1. 5 
 
The Reservoir Elevation – Storage Relationship 
The relationship between storage and elevation is 
very important in the dam break study. No fixed 
formula is found in literature for this relationship. From 
the scatter diagram of the storage – elevation data of 
reservoirs, the best fit equation may be a polynomial, 
logarithmic, exponential or power equation. Elevation – 
storage field data of Haditha reservoir can be seen in 
Table (1). A statistical analysis program SPSS 
(Statistical Package for Social Sciences) is used to find 
the best fit equation for the elevation – storage data of 
Haditha reservoir. This equation is: 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
Elv
..expS 9144596211                … (7) 
 
where: 
S  = Volume of water stored at the specified elevation 
(Elv) in billion m3. 
Elv = Water level in the reservoir in m a.s.l. 
The coefficient of determination for equation (7) is 
(R2= 0. 998). 
Equation (7) does not give zero volume at an 
elevation of 100m a.s.l. Therefore, for the dam break 
analysis, a linear equation is used for the first two points 
(Al-Ghazali, 2009): 
 ( )100
19
770 −= Elv.S                          … (8) 
 
MODEL RESULTS 
 
The computed reservoir hydrograph of Haditha dam 
is shown in Fig. (5). The maximum reservoir outflow is 
(202547m3/s) which occurred about three and half hours 
after dam failure. The Figure shows that after about 65 
hours from the dam failure, the whole volume of the 
reservoir will be going out to the river reach, indicating 
that the reservoir was depleted at the end of simulation 
time. At (966) minutes after the dam failure, the 
reservoir water surface elevation was 119m a. s. l. For 
times beyond (966) minutes, Eq. (8) was used instead of 
Eq. (7) because the application of Eq. (7) ends for an 
elevation of (119), and that is why the abrupt change in 
the trend of outflow hydrograph is seen for this period 
(Al-Ghazali, 1999). 
 
Table 1. The elevation – storage field data of 
Haditha dam 
Storage 
(billion m3) 
Elevation 
(m a.s.1.) 
0 100 
0. 77 119 
1. 17 122 
3. 97 135. 84 
5. 26 140 
6. 4 143 
7 144 
7. 64 145. 87 
7. 96 146. 4 
8. 3 147 
9. 7 150 
 
Macdonald and Langridge-Monopolis (1984) 
developed best-fit and envelope curves for peak outflow 
from breached earth fill dams as a function of the breach 
formation factor. These curves were used to verify 
reasonable results from breach simulations carried out 
using breach parameters predicted from the breach 
formation factor (Wahl, 1998). 
By using the graphs presented by Macdonald and 
Monopolis to check the breach development time and 
peak outflow, it is found that : 
1- Maximum breach development time = 5. 5 hr. 
2- Peak outflow = 240550 m3/s. 
It is assumed that the breach development time will 
be equal to (3.5 hours), which is less than the maximum 
breach development time (5.5 hours). The computed 
peak outflow is (202547m3/s) and is also less than the 
peak outflow (240550m3/s). Therefore, the results of the 
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hydrologic model situate within the limits of the study of Macdonald and Monopolis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, the calculations of the breach 
hydrograph are based on the assumption that within 
three and half hours after an enemy attack on Haditha 
dam almost the complete dam to the left of the 
powerhouse block will be eroded. The size of the breach 
is calculated for each time step by assuming a linear 
growth of width and depth from the initial values until 
the final depth within the given breach time. The first 
phase of breach is assumed to be a trapezoidal channel 
with 86.5m top width and 22.5m bottom width and the 
final breach has a bottom width of 420m and a side 
angle of about 26.50 at the left valley side and a vertical 
delimitation at the powerhouse block. It is assumed that 
the material is eroded down to an elevation of 100.00m 
a.s.l. The model results indicated that the maximum 
reservoir outflow is (202547m3/s), which occurred 
about three and half hours after dam failure, and the 
reservoir will be depleted after about 65 hours. 
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Figure 5: Reservoir outflow hydrograph 
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